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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondentf

s
Case No*
14421

-vs~
FARHAD SOROUSHIRN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance, to-wits

marijuana, a misdemeanor, in violation of

Utah Code Ann* § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found guilty
on December 15f 1975, in the Second Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding*

On December 15 f 1975f the

trial court fined appellant $100.00*
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the
judgment of the jury and the fine of the trial court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 2 and 3, 1975, Mrc Djafar Tawakolif a former
Persian student at Weber State College, made arrangements for
terminating his tenancy of apartment No* 119 at the Warren
House Apartments in Ogden City? Utah (Tre20-32,94-99,102-105,

I
109,111-113).

Beth Weinle, then assistant manager of the apart-

ment house, testified that on July 2* 1975, Djafar checked out
of his room by giving her two keys to his roonu one mail box
4
key and one door keyc At that time, she testified he told her
he was moving out (Tr.21-24,27,28)« Although Mrc Tawakoli
denied turning in his door key on July 2, 1975, he did testify
that on that date he went to the managerfs office, turned in

4

his mail box key and paid the assistant manager $12*00 rent
for the last two days he resided in room 119 (Tr.97,104,111-113)•
Ms* Weinle, the assistant manager, testified she
then told the maid to go to room 119 and clean it (Tre23)«
She was unclear as to exactly which day the maid did clean
(Tre24,26,27,29) , although the maid testified she thought she
first went to the room on July 3, 1975 (Tre38)c

Geraidine

Brown, the maid, stated when she went to the apartment, she
noticed that there were some personal items in it, so she
relocked the door and informed the assistant manager, Ed
Weinle, of the situation (Tr.33,34)c

The manager of the

apartments, Donna Merryman, later that day instructed Ms*
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Brown to return to the apartment and inventory the items
according to the standard procedure when a former tenant
leaves items behind (Trc34)o
During this inventory *> Ms* Brown testified they
found a plastic bag which looked

Bfi

awful funny" and a cloth

bag which also aroused her suspicions (Tr«34,35,40,41)*

She

further testified that the manager told her to find the
police officers who also lived in the apartment house, which
she did? leaving the bags on the kitchen counter (Tr*35,36,41)«
She and the two officer returned shortly, she testified, and
then she left (Trc36,37,41).
Joseph William G8Keefe, a patrolman with the Ogden
City Police Department, testified that he and his roommate
James Robert McKinley, went with Ms. Brown to room 119
where he opened a plastic baggie and opined that it was
"definitely marijuana*86 (Tr«42-44r52) . OfKeefe testified he
learned from Mrsc Merryman that the apartment had been vacated
by a Persian student who had just left for Persia (Tr.44)»

He

stated he then searched the apartment, discovering yet
another plastic bag containing what he believed to be marijuana
(Tr.44,45,54,55,56)e

0*Keefe testified he put the bags on the

counter along with the cloth bag whose contents he could not
identify, and then went to call the Ogden City Police Department
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Narcotics Squad (Tr.45)e

While he was doing sof he testified

Jerry Merryman came to tell him that persons unknown to him
were removing items from apartment 119 and placing them in
a vehicle in front of the apartment (Tr.46)c

According to

his testimony9 O'Keefe approached one of the men coming down
the stairway and asked him what he was doingf to which the
man responded that he was helping a friend move and that
his friend had returned to Persia (Tr«46)c

OfKeefe said

that he and Mr* Merryman then went up to the apartment
where he saw the man identified as the appellant, Farhad
Soroushirn, inside the room (Tr*46,47).

When asked by

O'Keefe what he was doing there, the appellant responded
that he had come to pick up his friendfs possessions (Trt47).
At that pointv the officer testified Mr« Merryman indicated
that the "stuff's gone1* (Tro47,48)r whereupon OfKeefe observed
that the two plastic baggies had been removed from the counter
(Tr 0 48K

O'Keefe testified that he asked both men what

happened to the marijuana9 to which they both responded
M

they had no idea what we were talking aboutf that they had

not seen any marijuana*18

(Tr*48)e

According to his

testimonyf O'Keefe identified himself as a police officer
and gave them the Miranda warningf taking time to explain
each portion of it to them (Tr*48f58)*

O'Keefe testified

he told them they were trespassing at which point the other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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person stated he had not entered the apartment, "that
Mr. Soroushirn was loading the boses (sic) and personal
items up and placing them in the hall*, and that the
other gentleman was taking them from the hall and transporting them to the car*? and Mrc Soroushirn agreed with
that statement*" (Tr.49)«
OfKeefe testified he then asked the appellant
and the other man to return all the items to the apartment
house that had been placed in the vehicle.
for a patrolman*
to the call.

He then called

Officer Soakai, the patrolman,responded

After Mr* 0BKeefe signed a citizen's

complaint against the appellant, Officer Soakai read the
Miranda warning to him (Tr.91) and took him to the
police station (Tr.79K
James Robert McKinley, a reserve police officer
and state liquor narcotics agent at the time of this
incident, testified that he went with Officer 0*Keefe to
room 119 when called by Ms* Brown* and that he left the
apartment temporarily while Mr. OfKeefe had gone to call
the police, returning to find O'Keefe talking with the
appellant and his partner (Tr.67,68)c

After he was

informed that the baggies were gone, he testified he
started to look for them, eventually finding them enclosed
in the cavity of a tape recorder in a box in the apartment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Tr«68,69,70)•

According to McKinley^s testimony, when he

asked the appellant if he knew whose tape recorder it was he
denied owning it (Tr.69K
Two days later, according to Mr. McKinley, while
he was doing some maintenance work for Warren Apartments,
the appellant approached him asking, "Why did you do this to
me, brother? or something like that**6 (Trt71)c
said he answered

McKinley

B8

because itss my job" (Tr*85) and that

if the appellant had at first been truthful, the matter
may not have gone as far as it did.

The appellant responded,

"Well, if I had of told you the truth then I would have got
in trouble," according to Mr* McKinley and further indicated
that the tape recorder was his but he had loaned it to his
friend (Tr*72,85,87-89)•
The appellant then stated he did not own the
marijuana but admitted putting the marijuana in the back of
the tape recorder, according to Mrc McKinleyfs testimony
(Tr.73-74)*
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED THE INCRIMINATING
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS JAMES ROBERT McKINLEY*
In the pretrial hearing on the date of his trial,
the appellant moved to suppress incriminating statements made
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to one of the State's witnesses, James Robert McKinley, one
of the two men called to room 119 by the maid of the Warren
Apartments to look at the suspicious looking items discovered
therein,, This motion was argued and subsequently denied by the
trial court (Tr^-lS), and later renewed and reargued by the
appellant when the jury retired to determine the verdict$
again denied by the trial court (Tr.132-137)c
Appellant contends that the state has the burden of
showing that incriminating statements were voluntarily given
before they are admissiblef relying on State v. Dunkleyr
85 Utah 546, 39 P.2d 1097 (1935).

In Dunkley, the Utah

Supreme Court held that the State has the burden of showing
the voluntariness of a confession before determining
admissiblity*

its

In the case at bar, the incriminating

statements made to Mr. McKinley fail to constitute a fullblown confession but respondent will discuss the case regardless because it supports the trial courtfs ruling.

Dunkley

requires that where there, is a question as to the voluntariness
of statements, a hearing should be held before the court in
the absence of the jury to determine the issue*

In the instant

case, this hearing was held pursuant to the motion to suppress
made by the appellant (Trc4-61 and renewed 132-137).

Several

pages of argument and testimony satisifed the Dunkley burden
on the prosecution.

Appellant claims that Mr. McKinley

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"concealed" his identity as a reserve officer in cm attempt
to "coerce9 confuse9 deceive and trick" hiitu

Appellant

further claims that because of Mr* McKinleyfs actions
he did not voluntarily give his statements because he did
not voluntarily waive his right not to speakc
Quite to the contrary9 the record is replete with
testimony that Mr* McKinley did not try to "conceal" his
identity or in any other way attempt to "coerce, confuser
deceive or trick" the appellantc

Mr* McKinley testified

that he recalled informing the appellant of his identity
when the appellant approached him two days after his arrest
(Tr.77,85).

Further, Mr 0 McKinley in no way misrepresented

his position to the appellant because it was he who made the
citizen's arrest and the appellant knew thisf thereby
aware that Mr. McKinley was not disposed towards hiitw
Moreover9 this was not Mr* McKinleyfs investigation? in
factf he was off duty at the time of this incident, he being
assigned to undercover work in Southern Utah (Tr.74-75)*
He and O'Keefe were asked to the apartment but they were
off duty and assisted only until the on-duty officer arrived.
Although it is true that Mr. McKinley did not give
the appellant a Miranda warning (Tr.77), the appellant was
advised of his rights by two different individuals when he
was arrested, first by Mr.. O'Keefe (Tr.4-8,58), and then by
Officer Soakai (Tr.91)*

When asked if he understood the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Miranda warning given and explained to him, the appellant
stated that he did (Tr.49,58)«

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 UoS. 436/16 LeEd.2d 694, 86 SeCte 1602 (1966), dealt
with the problem of police-custodial and police-dominated
interrogations, holding that where a suspect has been taken
into custody or is in a police-dominated atmosphere, the
police may not use any statements made by the suspect in
the absence of procedural safeguards to secure the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.

The

United States Supreme Court further held that these
procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that any
statement made was truly the product of the suspectfs
free choice and not compelled by the atmosphere of the
custodial interrogation itselfi
"« * * the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination* By custodial interrogation,
we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. As
for the procedural safeguards to be employed,
unless other full effective means are devised
to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

to exercise it, the following measures
are requiredc Prior to any questioningr
the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointedc The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligentlyc If, howeverf he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question
hiiru The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right
to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.".
436 UoS* at 444,445c
The cases decided in the Miranda decision all shared
salient features—"incommunicado interrogation of individuals
in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in incriminating
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.*
Idc at 445.
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from the
cases before the Court in Miranda*

Here, the appellant was

advised of his constitutional rights not once but twice.
Even if appellant should argue what constituted his custody,
he cannot escape the fact that Mr. O'Keefe advised him of his

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rights as soon as it became apparent the appellant might
be in possession of the marijuana.

Moreoverf appellant

was given the Miranda warning a second time when he was
arrested and taken into custody by Officer Soakai*
Appellants contention that Mr* McKinleyfs failure to
give the appellant an additional Miranda warning overlooks
the fact that the Miranda decision does not require every
person talking with the suspect to individually and separately
advise him of his rights. FurtherP Mr. McKinley testified
that he did not feel obligated to give the Miranda warning
(To77) only reinforces his viewpoint that he was not conducting
an investigation but that he was merely giving off-duty
assistance in a situation that demanded his aid. Mr.
McKinley was present when Mr. O'Keefe advised the appellant
of his rights so he knew that the appellant had been apprised
of his constitutional protections (Tr.77)»
Appellant argues that the statements the appellant
made to Mr. McKinley two days after his arrest should also
have been suppressed on various grounds including that the
statements

Ef

stemmed81 from the original custodial interrogation

and that somehow Mr. McKinley was misrepresenting his interest
in the case.

These arguments are bankrupt for several reasons:

(1) Miranda v. Arizona, supra, concerns custodial or policeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dominated atmosphere *

In this case, the record reveals that

the second encounter between Mr* McKinley and the appellant
occurred at the Warren Apartments and were initiated by the
appellant*

This is clearly not the kind of atmosphere con-

sidered in Mirandao
(2)

In two recent decisions, the Utah Supreme

Court has addressed the question of what to do in the
situation in which a suspect states he wants to remain silent
but then reinitiates conversation with the police and mak6s
incriminating statements•

In State v. Easthope, 29 Utah 2d

400, 510 Pe2d 933 (1973), this Court decided that where a
defendant had first stated he did not want to make a statement
and that he wanted to see a lawyer and then asked the reason
for his arrest, the incriminating statements he made
following the policemanss answer were not protected because
he had voluntarily made the statements after having been
informed of his rights*
State Ve Sims, 30 Utah 2d 251, 516 P*2d 354 (1973),
discusses a similar situations

the defendant called an

attorney but nevertheless told the officers to w go ahead"
with their questions, thereby waiving his privilege by
voluntarily answering their questions.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(3)

There is some testimony that Mr* McKinley

informed the appellant of his occupation as reserve
police officer and state liquor narcotics agent at this
time^ so it is difficult to see how Mr t McKinley "misrepresented his interest c "
(4)

At no point in the record is there any

indication that at this meeting Mr« McKinley asked the
appellant questions over his protest or against his wishes
(Tr.71-74,82-86,87-89).
Finally, appellant contends that both his broken
English and Mr. McKinley s s failure to make a written report
of what transpired should have been enough to justify
exclusion of his testimony•

This contention ignores the

fact that although English is not the appellant's native
tongue he was at the time of this incident a student at
Weber State College (TrdlS) and attended classes taught
in English.

Moreover, although it might have proved helpful

had Mr e McKinley made a report of this incidentr he was
under no obligation to do so* His recollection of exact
phrasing or lack thereof was a consideration for the jury
as it always is in weighing the credibility of witnesses.
Certainly an imperfect memory of a witness is no reason for
excluding his testimony altogether.
Respondent submits that the trial court correctly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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admitted the testimony of witness McKinley.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE BAGS OF
MARIJUANA INTO EVIDENCE.
On the day of this incident, Messrsc O'Keefe and
McKinley were called by the manager of the Warren Apartments
to come and help them determine the contents of the suspicious
looking bags in room 119 * When they arrived they observed the
plastic bag on the countertop in the roonu

Only after

determining it was marijuana did they look around the room
for more contraband*
Appellant cited Mapp ve Ohio, 367 U C S C 643, 6 L*Ed«
2d 1081, 81 S.Cte 1684 (1961), as authority for his claim
that this evidence should have been suppressed*

Mapp stands

for the proposition that evidence obtained by unconstitutional
searches and seizures is inadmissible at trial in a state
courte

Respondent has no quarrel with the soundness of this

proposition but maintains it does not apply under the facts
of this casec

Respondent submits that there was no illegal

search and seizure of evidence because there was no search and
seizure in the first place*

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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According to State vc Simpson, 541 P*2d 1114
(Utah 1975)f the Utah Supreme Court is "obliged to view the
evidence/ and whatever inferences may be fairly and reason-*
ably drawn therefrom0

e

* *n

IcL at 1115. Applying this

doctrine to the instant casef it is clear that Djafar Tawakolx
paid rent for the last two days he was therer July 1 and July
29 1975, and that he left for Persia July 3 r 1975r in the morning,.
Further9 there is evidence that he turned in some keys when he
paid the assistant manager his two days1 rent on July 2r 1975*
Thus? having paid only two days1 rentP he gave up possession
of the room at the end of July 2f 1975. Although some of
his possessions remained in the roomf he had no "possessory
rights" to the apartment for himself or to transfer to the
appellant or anyone else, as appellant claims * Thereforef
it was not improper for the manager of the apartment to enter
the room and inventory those items left behind,, Djafar had
given up his tenancy to it*

When the maid discovered the

plastic baggie she put it on the countertop and went to get
the two officers in the building.

Furthermoref the first

time McKinley and OfKeefe saw this plastic bag it was in
plain view.

According to State y« Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41f

395 P.2d 535 (1964)9 where an item is observed in plain
view* no search is made by observing it*

"Under such

circumstances, where no search is required the constitutional
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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guaranty is not applicable•,f
395 P.2d at 537*

Id«, 16 Utah 2d at 43/

See also State v, Sims, 30 Utah 2d 251,

516 Po2d 354 (1973)*

Also, the Utah Supreme Court in

State Vc Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P,2d 651 (1972), held
that where there was a seizure of that which is in plain
sight, there is no searcho
Therefore, Officer OfKeefe and Mrc McKinley did
not make any search at all of the first bag of marijuana*
Respondent submits that there was no search for this marijuana
because it was in plain view and because the two men were there
by invitation of the manager who had lawful possession of the
apartment as of July 3, 1975, a fact suported by the appellantps
own testimonyc
As to the second bag of marijuana, it was properly
introduced into evidence also because the search for it was
permitted by the manager of the apartments, the person in
lawful possession of the room, and because Mr* OfKeefe was
obligated to do so in view of the fact that the presence of
the known contraband raised suspicions about the rest of the
items left in the room*

In other words, even had the manager

not been in lawful possession of the apartment, Officer
O'Keefe would have been obligated to investigate suspicious
circumstancesc

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U*S* 1, 20 LrEd.2d 889,

: Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\;vV'V. -i6«

^

88 SeCt. 1868 (1968).

Terry stands for the proposition

that a police officer can and should investigate
suspicious circumstances in order to prevent or curtail
criminal activity*, Appellant claims that the officers
had no right to search the personalty in room 119r but
this claim overlooks the fact that so far as the manager
knew, the items were abandoned and thereby under the
manager's controle

Respondent submits that Terry v.

OhiOy supra, is controlling and that Officer OfKeefe and
Mr. McKinley were obligated and entitled to search.

The

second bag of marijuana was properly admitted into evidence
at trial*
Finally, the search for the marijuana after it
had been removed from the counter in OfKeefers and
McKinleyfs absence is also permissible under Terry v r Ohio,
supray because it was clear that someone had taken possession
of the contraband, an unlawful act which required immediate
investigation*
The Utah Supreme Court has held that whether a
search and seizure is reasonable is for the trial court to
determine in the first instance.

State v. Allred, supra;

State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240 (1963); State
Vc Sims, supra.

On appeal the evidence must be viewed in

-17-
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the light most favorable to the jury verdict*

State v.

Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 351 Pe2d 183 (1960); State
Vo Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 106 (1959).

In other

words, unless there is a clear showing of unreasonableness,
the decision of the lower court must be affirmed.

State y»

Romero, 554 Pc2d 216 (Utah 1976).
Respondent submits that the contraband was
properly and permissibly seized and was properly admitted
into evidence by the trial court*
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the arguments and
authority presented herein, it is urged that this Court
affirmed appellantps conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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